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LEGAL

Supreme Court Strikes Down DOMA’s Key Provision, Ducks on Prop 8
Legal same-sex marriages win federal recognition; California weddings will resume, but no broader ruling on right to marry
n a pair of 5-4 rulings released
on June 26, the United
States Supreme Court held
that Section 3 of the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA)
violates the Fifth Amendment of the
US Constitution, but that the court
did not have jurisdiction to decide
whether California’s Proposition 8
violates the 14th Amendment, because
the initiative’s Official Proponents,
who appealed District Court Judge
Vaughn Walker’s decision finding
it un con s titut i o n a l , l a c k f e de r a l
constitutional standing to have done so.
There is a 25-day period during
which the Official Proponents can seek
rehearing, after which the high court’s
mandate in the Prop 8 case will go to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which must then issue an order dismissing the appeal and lifting the stay
on Walker’s 2010 ruling.
At that point, later in July or early
in August, same-sex marriages could
once again become available throughout California, though the Official Proponents may yet argue that Walker’s
order does not apply to anyone other
than the two plaintiff couples or the
two counties sued and thereby delay
that outcome.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr.,
wrote for the high court in the challenge that Edith (“Edie”) Schlain Windsor, a New York widow, brought against
DOMA based on a $360,000 inheritance tax imposed on her after the
death of her spouse, Thea Spyer. He
produced a somewhat typical Kennedy
opinion that obscures the ruling’s doctrinal basis and will leave commentators and lower courts guessing as to its
effect in subsequent cases.
He referred to liberty protected by
the US Constitution’s due process
clause, federalism issues related to
the traditional authority of the states
to decide who can marry, and the
equal protection requirements that the
Court has found to be part of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause.
In some respects, his opinion evoked
his 1996 opinion for the court in Romer
v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado voter amendment that prohibited
any nondiscrimination laws based on
sexual orientation in that state. Kennedy’s argument regarding DOMA rested
on the idea that any enactment whose
clear purpose and effect are to treat
some people adversely, creating a sort
of second-class citizenship, is unconstitutional on its face, without much
need for further analysis.
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Chad Griffin, the president of the Human Rights Campaign, who as founder of the American Foundation for Equal Rights
launched the Prop 8 litigation, seen with one of AFER’s lead attorneys, David Boies.

At the March 27 oral arguments,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
described state marriage without federal benefits as “skim milk marriage.”
Kennedy did not adopt that nomenclature, instead referring to second-class
marriage.
As usual with Kennedy, his opinion
avoids the technical terminology of
constitutional analysis many commentators use in describing what standard
of judicial review applies to the case,
so it is not easy to classify it among
categories including “strict scrutiny,”
“heightened scrutiny,” “suspect classifications,” or “rational basis.”
The court, therefore, avoided settling the differences between standards
applied by the trial court, which used
the most deferential scrutiny in evaluating DOMA and found it lacks any
defensible rational basis, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which
found that “heightened scrutiny”
should apply to sexual orientation discrimination cases, a situation in which
the government must show a compelling non-discriminatory purpose for a
law. The appeals panel, while upholding Windsor’s trial court win, noted
that DOMA’s Section 3 would survive a
less demanding, more deferential rational basis review.
Kennedy’s approach in this respect
was at least a small disappointment for
Windsor’s counsel, Roberta Kaplan of
Paul, Weiss LLP, and the LGBT Rights
Project at the American Civil Liberties
Union, who had hoped that a “heightened scrutiny” ruling by the Supreme
Court could be used in other cases,
especially pending cases challenging
state bans on same-sex marriage in
other parts of the country. Claims of
discrimination raised regarding laws
subjected to heightened scrutiny are

more difficult to defend against.
As usual when responding to a Kennedy gay rights opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent expressed relief
that the court had not used heightened scrutiny to strike down the 1996
law, but he then expressed puzzlement
about its basis. After summarizing and
criticizing Kennedy’s analysis, Scalia
wrote, “Some might conclude that this
loaf could have used a while longer in
the oven. But that would be wrong; it
is already overcooked. The most expert
care in preparation cannot redeem a
bad recipe. The sum of all the court’s
non-specific hand-waving is that this
law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantivedue-process grounds, and perhaps
with some amorphous federalism component playing a role) because it is
motivated by a ‘bare… desire to harm’
couples in same-sex marriages.”
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan joined Kennedy’s decision
and did not write separately.
President Barack Obama promptly
issued a statement applauding the
court’s ruling and said he had directed
Attorney General Eric Holder “to work
with other members of my Cabinet
to review all relevant federal statutes
to ensure this decision, including its
implications for federal benefits and
obligations, is implemented swiftly and
smoothly.”
In a press conference to discuss the
Prop 8 ruling, Chad Griffin, the president of the Human Rights Campaign,
said he had spoken to Holder “to discuss with him an expedited implementation of the DOMA ruling.”
This is especially good news for binational married same-sex couples,
whose marriages can now be recog-

nized as equal to those of different-sex
couples, and it eliminates the need to
amend the immigration reform legislation pending in Congress, something
that even reform advocates who are
marriage equality supporters, like New
York Senator Chuck Schumer, have
warned could derail that bill’s prospects.
Under the president’s directive,
those federal statutes that contain specialized marriage definitions for particular policy purposes should now
be construed to treat lawful same-sex
marriages the same as lawful differentsex marriages.
However, as Scalia pointed out in
his acerbic dissent, the court’s opinion is obscure on one very important
question — whether lawfully mar ried same-sex couples who live, work,
or travel in states that don’t recognize
same-sex marriages will be recognized as married for federal purposes
in such locations should the question
arise. Kennedy ended his opinion with
a cryptic statement, “This opinion and
its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.” That sentence followed
a passage criticizing DOMA because it
“singles out a class of persons deemed
by a State entitled to recognition and
protection to enhance their own liberty” and has the effect of “disparag[ing]
and injur[ing] those whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.”
This section of Kennedy’s opinion
relies on principles of federalism, under
which a state may, presumably, decide
not to perform or recognize same-sex
marriages unless, of course Kennedy’s
due process and equal protection concerns would override that state’s reservations. That’s a question he does not
resolve in his opinion.
There were three dissenting opinions. Scalia’s dissent was joined by
Justice Clarence Thomas and, in part,
by Chief Justice John Roberts, who
wrote his own dissent as well. Justice Samuel Alito also wrote a dissent,
which was joined in part by Thomas. Roberts and Scalia argued that
the court did not have jurisdiction to
decide the DOMA case, because the
Justice Department, whose appeal
was granted in this case, agreed with
the rulings by the trial court and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Consequently, the parties before the court
were not “adverse” on the merits and
so lacked a true “case or controversy”
as required by the Constitution. They
both suggested that it was not appro-
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priate for the government to ask the
Supreme Court to affirm a lower court
decision with which the government
agrees.
The chief justice’s dissent stressed
the “federalism” aspects of Kennedy’s
opinion, a focus that could lessen its
significance for pending challenges to
state same-sex marriage bans. Roberts
pointed to the fact that Kennedy’s opinion purported to take no position on
the question whether same-sex couples
have a right to marry under the 14th
Amendment. He said “the disclaimer
is a logical and necessary consequence
of the argument that the majority has
chosen to adopt. The dominant theme
of the majority opinion is that the federal government’s intrusion in an area
‘central to state domestic relations law
applicable to its residents and citizens’
is sufficiently ‘unusual’ to set off alarm
bells. I think the majority goes off
course, as I have said, but it is undeniable that its judgment is based on federalism.”
As such, Roberts would argue, it has
no relevance to disputes over the basic
question of whether same-sex couples
have an underlying right to marry.
Roberts did not join the part of Scalia’s colorfully worded dissent where he
disagreed with Kennedy on the merits
of the case. Scalia discounted Kennedy’s disclaimer that the court was not
deciding whether same-sex couples
have a constitutional right to marry,
predicting that lower courts would rely
on his opinion to strike down state
restrictions on same-sex marriage. In
fact, Scalia took the unusual step of
demonstrating how a lower court could
appropriate paragraphs from Kennedy’s opinion, change a few of the words,
and produce a result requiring a state
to let same-sex couples marry. Scalia’s
dissents in gay rights cases are usually packed with impassioned rhetoric,
and this was no exception, but this is
the first time he actually shows lower
courts how to accomplish the terrible
results he forecasts will occur. (Ten
years ago to the day, in his dissent disagreeing with Kennedy’s opinion in the
Lawrence case that struck down sodomy laws nationwide, Scalia warned
that opinion would open the way for
gay marriage.)
Alito, by contrast, argued in his dissent that the intervention of Speaker
John Boehner’s so-called Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the House
of Representatives (BLAG) — which
stepped in to defend DOMA when the
Justice Department announced two
years ago it would no longer do so —
took care of the “case or controversy”
problem. He suggested there is necessarily a role for the courts to play when
both the plaintiff and the government
agree that a statute is unconstitutional. And he accepted BLAG’s contention

that Congress has a legitimate interest
in defending such a statute to protect
its legislative authority.
Alito disagreed with Kennedy on
the merits of the constitutional claim,
asserting that whether the federal
government must recognize samesex marriages was a political question
not suitable for resolution by the high
court. Noting that the Constitution has
nothing to say about same-sex mar riage one way or the other, he argued
the issue should be left to individual
states to decide through their political
processes.

Chief Justice Roberts
wrote for the majority in
the Prop 8 case, where he

argued that amendment’s Of ficial
Proponents did not have standing to
appeal Judge Walker’s ruling that it
violated the 14th Amendment because
they had no personal tangible stake in
the outcome.
Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan
joined the court’s opinion. Kennedy
wrote a dissent joined by Thomas,
Alito, and Sotomayor. Pundits will
undoubtedly tie themselves in knots
trying to figure out why three of the
Democratic appointees joined Scalia and the chief justice in the majority while Sotomayor joined Kennedy
and the court’s two most conservative
members, Alito and Thomas, in the dissent, especially since the four Democratic appointees were united in joining
Kennedy’s decision on the merits in the
Windsor case.
Although the immediate results of
both decisions are clear, their longerterm effects are not. The full meaning
of a Supreme Court opinion cannot be
determined on the day it is issued, but
will depend on the responses of government officials, legislators, and lower
courts, as well as private sector actors.
Section 3 of DOMA is gone, but that
does not necessarily mean that all the
barriers to full equality in federal rights
are necessarily eliminated or will all
disappear overnight. The president’s
prompt statement and the comments
HRC’s Griffin made about his conversations with the attorney general suggest that by the time the high court
issues its mandate in the Windsor case
toward the end of July, there should
be some guidance from the Justice
Department so that all federal agencies are on the same page concerning
treatment of legally married same-sex
couples.
It would be particularly helpful if this
guidance addressed the issue of lawfully married couples who reside in states
that don’t recognize same-sex marriages. The pending Respect for Marriage
bill in Congress would mandate federal
recognition for those marriages regardless of where the couple happens to live
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